the 1990S
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In the early 1990s, China and Russia drastically cut their food, equipment, and crude oil aid to North Korea. As a result, the country suffered from a massive drop in agricultural and industrial production. Because significantly less food was being produced, the nation instituted a food ration, allowing people only two small meals each day. This practice, combined with collectivist policies and cycles of flood and drought caused an enormous famine. National policy change also meant that food was no longer grown in exchange for industry, resulting in less fertilizer and pesticide availability and therefore, even smaller crops.
Starving farmers began to fight back against the collective system, choosing to feed their families before giving food to the collective. They secretly hoarded part of the harvest to keep their own families alive, meaning even less food was on the market for the rest of the country to eat. The problem got so bad that soldiers were assigned to watch over farms and ensure the entire crop was handed over, but the soldiers were starving, too. The farmers were easily able to bribe them with their own small portion of the harvest. Some farmers even maintained their own secret plots of food crops hidden on the mountainsides, putting so much more effort into those plots than their main farms that soldiers had to take over the responsibility of growing the nation's food.
Secret plots and hoarded food was able to keep most farming families alive, but industrial workers were in serious danger of starvation. Not only did they depend on the dwindling national food supply, but the national food distribution system was being replaced but private farmers' markets with very high prices. At the same time, industry (and therefore industrial salaries) was in sharp decline, meaning most of these people could not afford to but enough food for their families. A single kilogram of maize (enough to feed the average family for less than a day) cost a worker his entire month's wages.
From 1992 to 1994, the public distribution system fell apart and food distributions nearly came to a halt. In response to the disaster, the central government chose to sacrifice four provinces in the east deemed least militarily and politically significant. All food that would have been shipped to these provinces was cut off, creating a slightly larger supply for the rest of the country. This certainly helped those provinces on the receiving end, but the four provinces that were cut off fell into complete famine.
In 1996, responsibility for feeding the people shifted to county administrators, and in some areas, the situation improved, depending on the skill and resources of the area's particular administrator. However, only the most talented were able to prevent severe famine. Two years later, the job of feeding each family was transferred to the family itself. Those who had their own gardens and grew their own food were able to get by, but most others, unless they had enough money to buy food, were not.
According to a former party ideologue's estimates, 500,000 people fell victim to the famine in 1995 alone. One million more were killed by the famine in each of the next two years. A Johns-Hopkins study of one of the better-off provinces, North Hamgyong, found the death rate had risen from .55% to 4.3% in that time period, signifying an estimate 245,000 deaths out of a total population of 2 million. North Hamgyong had three advantages over much of the rest of the country: fertile land, extensive trade with China, and weak travel restrictions that allowed people to work and beg in bordering China. Taking these advantages as well as the percentage of deaths into consideration, the total death toll estimates mentioned above are believed to be close to the truth.
Starving farmers began to fight back against the collective system, choosing to feed their families before giving food to the collective. They secretly hoarded part of the harvest to keep their own families alive, meaning even less food was on the market for the rest of the country to eat. The problem got so bad that soldiers were assigned to watch over farms and ensure the entire crop was handed over, but the soldiers were starving, too. The farmers were easily able to bribe them with their own small portion of the harvest. Some farmers even maintained their own secret plots of food crops hidden on the mountainsides, putting so much more effort into those plots than their main farms that soldiers had to take over the responsibility of growing the nation's food.
Secret plots and hoarded food was able to keep most farming families alive, but industrial workers were in serious danger of starvation. Not only did they depend on the dwindling national food supply, but the national food distribution system was being replaced but private farmers' markets with very high prices. At the same time, industry (and therefore industrial salaries) was in sharp decline, meaning most of these people could not afford to but enough food for their families. A single kilogram of maize (enough to feed the average family for less than a day) cost a worker his entire month's wages.
From 1992 to 1994, the public distribution system fell apart and food distributions nearly came to a halt. In response to the disaster, the central government chose to sacrifice four provinces in the east deemed least militarily and politically significant. All food that would have been shipped to these provinces was cut off, creating a slightly larger supply for the rest of the country. This certainly helped those provinces on the receiving end, but the four provinces that were cut off fell into complete famine.
In 1996, responsibility for feeding the people shifted to county administrators, and in some areas, the situation improved, depending on the skill and resources of the area's particular administrator. However, only the most talented were able to prevent severe famine. Two years later, the job of feeding each family was transferred to the family itself. Those who had their own gardens and grew their own food were able to get by, but most others, unless they had enough money to buy food, were not.
According to a former party ideologue's estimates, 500,000 people fell victim to the famine in 1995 alone. One million more were killed by the famine in each of the next two years. A Johns-Hopkins study of one of the better-off provinces, North Hamgyong, found the death rate had risen from .55% to 4.3% in that time period, signifying an estimate 245,000 deaths out of a total population of 2 million. North Hamgyong had three advantages over much of the rest of the country: fertile land, extensive trade with China, and weak travel restrictions that allowed people to work and beg in bordering China. Taking these advantages as well as the percentage of deaths into consideration, the total death toll estimates mentioned above are believed to be close to the truth.
food aid in the 1990s
From 1995 to 1998, over 3 million metric tons of food aid were delivered to North Korea, but it did little good. By this time, the famine was past its peak, and most of the victims were either already dead or too far into starvation to survive. Also, the government was in charge of distributing the food and did not give any to the previously cut off, hardest-hit areas. Third, at this point most of the public distribution system was shut down, and more isolated regions of the country were completely cut off.
This food aid also had several unintended consequences. First, because the public distribution system had been mostly shut down, corrupt officials sold the food themselves at high prices, effectively privatizing the food market. As more food came onto the market, the prices began to stabilize and go down. This new, private source of food made people less dependent on the central government and therefore question its authority. The fact that much of the aid came from nations the people had been taught to see as enemies led to more questioning of the state, and even rebellion. Many provinces saw higher rates of sabotage and rebellious behavior due to reductions in popular government support.
The food aid ended up undermining pro-government and anti-capitalist propaganda and effectively privatized the economy. It inspired sabotage and rebellion. This, unfortunately, encouraged the government's paranoia and totalitarian practices. It also led to the regime's refusal to end the famine- economic and agricultural reforms would threaten the state's control, and the deaths resulting from famine were seen as lesser than the threat of a military coup.
This food aid also had several unintended consequences. First, because the public distribution system had been mostly shut down, corrupt officials sold the food themselves at high prices, effectively privatizing the food market. As more food came onto the market, the prices began to stabilize and go down. This new, private source of food made people less dependent on the central government and therefore question its authority. The fact that much of the aid came from nations the people had been taught to see as enemies led to more questioning of the state, and even rebellion. Many provinces saw higher rates of sabotage and rebellious behavior due to reductions in popular government support.
The food aid ended up undermining pro-government and anti-capitalist propaganda and effectively privatized the economy. It inspired sabotage and rebellion. This, unfortunately, encouraged the government's paranoia and totalitarian practices. It also led to the regime's refusal to end the famine- economic and agricultural reforms would threaten the state's control, and the deaths resulting from famine were seen as lesser than the threat of a military coup.
The 2000s
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Starvation, food deprivation, and malnutrition continue to be widespread in North Korea, and the UN expects the famine to reach levels similar to the one on the 1990s in the very near future. In 2008, the UN's World Food Programme estimated that 6.5 million people, 30% of the population, were starving. In 2005, the average food ration was about 200-250 grams per day, only half the official recommended minimum calorie intake for survival. The year before, 57% of the population were starving, 37% of children suffered from stunted growth, 23% of children were underweight, and 7% were completely starved. One in every three mothers were underweight, and as many as 70% of children were starving.
Though the famine of the 1990s had some basis in natural disaster, the widespread starvation the country faces today are wholly caused by the Kim regime. Today, North Korea is relatively rich in agricultural resources and international aid. However, the central government carefully distributes food, causing some regions to survive and others to starve. Today's famine is caused by a central government using food, or lack thereof, as a weapon against its people.
Though the famine of the 1990s had some basis in natural disaster, the widespread starvation the country faces today are wholly caused by the Kim regime. Today, North Korea is relatively rich in agricultural resources and international aid. However, the central government carefully distributes food, causing some regions to survive and others to starve. Today's famine is caused by a central government using food, or lack thereof, as a weapon against its people.
These people are only a few of the millions who have been killed by the famines of the past decades. Children, being smaller and more vulnerable, are often the first to be killed. Mothers are early victims as well, having given their own rations up to their children in the hopes of helping them survive.